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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DAVID K. PETIT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 960032-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Pursuant to his conditional guilty plea, defendant was convicted of a reduced 
charge of attempted possession of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1991) (R. 66-76), and was sentenced to 
12 months in the Salt Lake County Jail, suspended for two years, pending probation (R. 
77-79). In exchange for his plea, the trial court dismissed an additional count of 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §58-37a-5 (1981), and the State recommended probation and no jail time (R. 69-
70). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(f) (1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Did police have probable cause to arrest defendant when, as a result of a 
protective seizure, they observed drug paraphernalia in his truck and a fresh needle 
mark on his arm? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A trial court's ruling on probable cause to make a warrantless arrest is not 
reversed on appeal "unless it clearly appears that [the trial court] was in error." State 
v. Anderson. 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996) (quoting State v. Rocha. 600 P.2d 543, 545 
(Utah 1979) (quoting State v. Eastmond. 28 Utah 2d 129, 499 P.2d 276, 278 (1972)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV (1791): 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 14 (1896): 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the person or thing to be seized.1 
1
 Aside from citing the Utah Constitution, (Def. Br. at 1), defendant has failed 
to raise or brief a state constitutional argument. Accordingly, any state constitutional 
claim should be deemed waived. State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 1985); 
State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920, 922-26 (Utah App. 1991); S££ State v. Watts. 750 
P.2d 1219, n.8 at 1221 (Utah 1988); State v. Schnoor, 845 P.2d 947, 950 (Utah App. 
2 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-1 (1980): 
An arrest is an actual restraint of the person arrested or submission 
to custody. The person shall not be subjected to any more restraint than is 
necessary for his arrest and detention. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-2 (1986): 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or 
may, without warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence 
of any peace officer; "presence" includes all of the physical senses or any 
device that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical 
sense, or records the observations of any of the physical senses; 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony has been 
committed and has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has 
committed it; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has 
committed a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing 
the person may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the 
commission of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage property 
belonging to another person. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1980): 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has 
a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of 
committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand 
his name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in an Information with unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
1993); State v. Earl. 716 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1986). 
3 
§58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1991), and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37a-5 (1981) (R. 4). 
Defendant moved to suppress all evidence seized after his arrest (R. 20-21).2 
The parties stipulated that the preliminary hearing transcript of two police officers' 
testimony (R. 23-52),3 a Salt Lake County No Warrant Arrest Fact Sheet (R. 59-60),4 
and certain background facts5 would constitute the evidence on the motion (R. 53, 98-
100). 
After a hearing, (R. 97-138), the trial court denied defendant's motion (R. 55-
57).6 Pursuant to a plea agreement, and to preserve the suppression issue for appeal, 
defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to a reduced charge of attempted possession 
of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§§58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1991) and 76-4-102(4) (1983). The trial court dismissed Count 2, 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §58-37a-5 (1981) (R. 66-76), and sentenced defendant to 12 months in the Salt 
2
 See appendix A. 
3
 See appendix B. 
4
 See appendix C. 
5
 See appendix D. 
6
 See appendix E. 
4 
Lake County Jail, which was stayed pending 2 years of court-ordered probation (R. 77-
80). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Officer Tuttle and two other uniformed Salt Lake City police officers were on 
nighttime foot patrol in a high crime area where the officers had frequently seized 
weapons from subjects before (R. 23-26, 31-32, 34, 39, 46-47, 59, 99). Defendant 
was parked in his truck facing the approaching officers. When they were within 20 
feet, and Officer Tuttle and defendant made eye contact, defendant suddenly lunged 
forward, reaching for something Officer Tuttle couldn't see (R. 24-26, 34-35, 37, 59). 
Because he couldn't see defendant's hands and he and the other officers were in the 
potential line of fire, and because of his prior experience in the area, Officer Tuttle 
believed their safety was threatened (R. 24-26, 35-36, 43, 48). Officer Tuttle drew his 
loaded pistol, pointed it at defendant, and ordered him to stop, to put his hands where 
he could see them, and then to put his hands on the steering wheel (R. 26-27, 36-38, 
48, 59). Officer Tuttle and Officer Hoffman walked closer to defendant's truck and 
looked inside (R. 27). Officer Hoffman saw several syringes through the open 
passenger window, and told Officer Tuttle (R. 27-28, 59). Officers Tuttle and 
Hoffman also saw blood on the inside crook of defendant's left elbow and concluded 
that defendant had recently injected drugs (R. 27, 29, 51, 59). Officer Tuttle asked 
defendant to get out of the truck (R. 28, 59). When defendant complied, both officers 
5 
saw a can lid, an item commonly used to cook cocaine before injecting it, fall to the 
ground (R. 29, 59). Officer Hoffman also saw defendant toss a syringe with red fluid 
back in the truck (R. 42, 51, 59; cL R. 29). From the time Officer Tuttle asked 
defendant to put his hands on the wheel until he asked defendant to get out of the truck 
was 10-15 seconds (R. 41). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under the totality of the circumstances, defendant's sudden movement, which 
was consistent with reaching for a weapon, reasonably caused Officer Tuttle to fear for 
his and the other officers' safety. The officers' actions in briefly freezing the situation 
and further investigating were reasonable and constituted a valid protective seizure, not 
an arrest without probable cause. After observing drug paraphernalia in defendant's 
truck and a fresh needle mark on his arm, police had probable cause to arrest him. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
Under Rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, "where factual 
issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its findings on the 
record." Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c). In its Memorandum Decision on the motion, the trial 
court made the following findings and conclusions: 
[A]t the time of this incident in question the defendant was parked in his 
vehicle, after dark, in a high crime area of Salt Lake City, Utah, a 
location known to the officers as a high drug crime area and an area in 
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which the officers had previously taken numerous weapons from 
individuals. 
The officers were walking and not in vehicles at the time eye 
contact was first made with the defendant. The officers at all times were 
on a public street in a location they were entitled by law and required by 
duty to be. The officers were walking toward the defendant's vehicle 
which was on the opposite side of the street from the officers. There is 
nothing unreasonable about the officers [sic] conduct so far. An officer is 
entitled to ask questions of anyone at anytime so long as there is no 
detention. 
When Officer Tuttle was within fifteen to twenty feet from the 
defendant's vehicle the defendant made a lunging motion downward into 
an area that could not be seen by Officer Tuttle. While this movement by 
the defendant is as consistent with defendant lunging for a spilled cup of 
coffee (as argued by defense Counsel) it is also just as consistent given the 
time and location, etc., with the defendant going for a weapon. Officer 
Tuttle, on foot, and completely vulnerable, was not obliged to wait and 
see what the defendant had in his hands before action was taken for self 
protection. At about this time Officer Hoffman on the other side of the 
vehicle was also standing on a public roadway and where he was entitled 
to be, observed in plain site [sic] the defendant throw a syringe and 
observed a needle mark with fresh blood on the defendant's arm. 
It was reasonable under the circumstances for Officer Tuttle to ask 
the defendant to exit his vehicle, at which time additional contraband was 
observed and the defendant made comments admitting that he was in 
possession of a syringe. 
The circumstances of this case, in the opinion of the court, are 
different from those cases where officers detain suspects and conduct 
searches simply on the strength of fidgety, nervous movement by those 
suspects. In this case the court is of the opinion that the officer, under all 
of the circumstances, was reasonably justified in acting as he did for self 
protection. 
The officer's actions were not unreasonable nor in violation of the 
defendant's constitutional rights and accordingly the Motion to Suppress is 
denied. 
(R. 55-56). 
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As defendant noted (Def. Br. n.l at 2), although the trial court directed the State 
" to prepare "more detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law" (R. 57), no 
additional findings or conclusions appear in die record. Significantly, defendant has 
neither challenged the trial court's findings, nor requested a remand for more detailed 
findings. In any event, the parties stipulated to the evidence on the motion, the trial 
court's findings are sufficiently detailed, and the essential facts are not in dispute. See 
State v. Vincent. 845 P.2d 254, n.8 at 259-60 (Utah App. 1992), reversed on other 
giojunds, 883 P.2d 278 (Utah 1994). 
Point I 
OFFICER TUTTLE'S BELIEF THAT DEFENDANT'S SUDDEN 
MOVEMENT AFTER MAKING EYE CONTACT WITH HIM WAS 
A POTENTIAL THREAT TO POLICE OFFICERS' SAFETY WAS 
REASONABLE UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
Defendant's general argument is that he was placed under arrest without 
probable cause at the moment Officer Tuttle pointed his gun at him (Def. Br. at 7). On 
the contrary, Officer Turtle's action constituted a protective seizure, not an arrest. A 
reasonable concern for safety, not rising to the level of probable cause for an arrest, 
justified this protective seizure. 
Under Terry v. Ohio. 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), and its progeny, there are three 
levels of police-citizen encounters, each requiring a different degree of justification 
under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Munsen. 821 P.2d 13, n.l at 15 (Utah App. 
8 
1991), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). The first level occurs when an officer 
approaches and questions a suspect. An officer may stop and question a person at any 
time so long as that person "is not detained against his [or her] will." LL The next 
level is reached when an officer temporarily seizes a person. In order to legally effect 
a temporary seizure, the officer must have "articulable suspicion" that the suspect has 
or is about to commit a crime, and the detention must be limited in scope. LL The 
third level is arrest, which requires probable cause for the officer to believe that a 
crime has been or is about to be committed. I$L 
A protective seizure fits in the second category. Sfi£, e.g.. State v. Bradford. 
839 P.2d 866 (Utah App. 1992). "A law enforcement agent, faced with the possibility 
of danger, has a right to take reasonable steps to protect himself and an obligation to 
ensure the safety of innocent bystanders, regardless of whether probable cause to arrest 
exists." United States v. Merkley. 988 F.2d 1062 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting United 
States v, Alexander, 907 F.2d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1990), cert.denied. I l l S.Ct. 983 
(1991)). tt[W]henever the police confront an individual reasonably believed to present 
a serious and imminent danger to the safety of the police and public, they are justified 
in taking reasonable steps to reduce the risk that anyone will get hurt." IsL (quoting 
United States v, Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1274 (10th Cir., 1982), cert.denied. 103 
S.Ct. 1898 (1983)). Sfi£ also., £ ^ , Terry v. Ohio. 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1967) (search for 
weapon) fcf. Utah Code Ann. §77-7-16 (1980); State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132, 
9 
1135 (Utah 1989) (ordering driver out of vehicle stopped for traffic violation); State v. 
•Bartley. 784 P.2d 1231, 1234 (Utah App. 1989) (blockade reasonable to neutralize 
danger to public and officers); State v. Cole. 674 P.2d 119, 124 (Utah 1983) (seizure 
of weapon). 
Regarding the kind of situation in this case, requiring "necessarily swift action 
predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat," (Terry. 88 
S.Ct. at 1879), the Supreme Court has written: 
When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose 
suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and 
presently dangerous to the officer or omers, it would appear to be clearly 
unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to 
determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to 
neutralize the threat of physical harm. 
Terry. 88 S.Ct. at 1881. 
There is a two-step inquiry when evaluating a warrantless protective seizure: 
first, "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception," and second, "whether 
[the action] was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place." Terry. 88 S.Ct. at 1879 (1968); United States v. 
McEafi, 81 F.3d 1528, 1533 (10th Cir. 1996). 
A. Officer Turtle's action was justified at its inception. The threshold issue 
regarding justification for Officer Turtle's action at its inception, is "whether a 
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his 
10 
safety or that of others was in danger." Terry, 88 S.Ct. at 1883. Judicial hindsight is 
not the test; rather, consideration must be given for the officer's reasonable concerns 
for safety and the split-second nature of his decisions during evolving field 
investigations. State v. Ramirez. 814 P.2d 1131, 1136 (Utah App. 1991). It is "not 
essential that the officer actually be in fear," or that he be "absolutely certain that the 
individual is armed." State y, Roybal, 716 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 1986) (citing United 
States v. Tharpe. 536 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1976), and quoting Terrv 88 S.Ct. at 
1883). Further, the experience of the officer is a factor to be carefully considered in 
determining whether a protective seizure is justified. United States v. Cortez. 101 
S.Ct. 690 (1981), reh. denied. 102 S.Ct. 1648 (1981). 
Defendant argues that "Officer Tuttle was merely concerned for his safety based 
on [defendant's] sudden movement in a high crime area upon being startled by the 
police." (Def. Br. at 5). With the omission of "merely," this is an accurate statement 
as far as it goes. The State likewise agrees, as Defendant further argues, that "[p]rior 
to [defendant's] sudden movement, the officers did not have any reason to stop him." 
(Def. Br. at 13).7 Although defendant concedes that his sudden movement "was 
consistent with reaching for a weapon," he nevertheless argues that it was "equally 
consistent with spilling a cup of coffee. The only additional fact contributing to Officer 
7
 Notably, sitting in his already-parked truck, defendant "wasn't going 
anywhere" even before Officer Tuttle ordered him to stop. 
11 
Turtle's suspicion was the location in a high crime area." (Def. Br. at 14). Defendant's 
- characterization of the circumstances is incomplete. 
In reviewing the totality of facts and circumstances here, we find three officers, 
at night, on foot patrol, in a high crime area where the officers have taken numerous 
weapons from subjects in the past (R. 23-26, 31-32, 34, 39, 46-47, 59, 99). When 
they come within 20 feet of defendant's parked truck, defendant makes eye contact with 
one of them, Officer Tuttle, then suddenly lunges forward in a movement consistent 
with reaching for a weapon (R. 24, 26, 34, 37, 59). Defendant's action is obviously 
prompted by his eye contact with Officer Tuttle. IsL The three officers are in the 
potential line of fire. I$L These circumstances are specific and articulable facts that 
support Officer Turtle's reasonable concern for his and the other officers' safety and 
which justified his swift action at its inception.8 
Officer Turtle's testimony and the precautionary actions he took clearly indicate 
his apprehension of harm (R. 26-27). His concern for safety was real. The Supreme 
Court has noted that approximately 30% of police shootings occur when an officer 
approaches a suspect seated in a vehicle. Michigan v. Long. 103 S.Ct. 3469, n.13 at 
3480 (1983); see. also United States v, Robinson, 94 S.Ct. 467, n.5 at 476 (1973) (FBI 
report indicates that 11 of 35 police officers murdered in a three-month period were 
* As it turns out, defendant was neither reaching for a weapon nor a cup of 
coffee. Upon seeing police approaching, he was trying to dispose of evidence of his 
drug abuse. Sfi£ Point n, below. 
12 
killed when the officers were making a traffic stop); State v. Johnson. 784 P.2d 1135, 
1137 (Utah 1989) (officer shot without warning as he approached vehicle); 3 W. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure, §9.4(a) n.26 (1987) (more officers are shot while 
conducting field interrogations than while dealing with known felons, and 43% of 
officer shootings that occurred pursuant to a vehicle stop take place after the initial 
contact has been made). 
While defendant argues that Officer Tuttle aiming his pistol at him constituted an 
arrest (Def. Br. at 5), it is settled in the 10th Circuit that "police officers may draw 
their weapons without transforming an otherwise valid Terry stop into an arrest." 
United States v. Perdue. 8 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted) (it was 
permissible for officers to have their guns drawn and order defendant out of automobile 
and onto the ground during Terry stop), and that police can point their weapons at a 
subject in connection with a permissible stop "where the police reasonably believe [the 
weapons] are necessary for their protection." United States v. Merritt. 695 F.2d 1263, 
1273 (10th Cir. 1982) (police were justified in pointing shotguns at the subjects during 
the course of the stop). This view is supported by United States v. Serna-Barreto. 842 
F.2d 965 (7th Cir. 1988), a case cited by defendant (Def. Br. at 15-16): 
Although we are troubled by the thought of allowing policemen to stop 
people at the point of a gun when probable cause to arrest is lacking, we 
are unwilling to hold that an investigative stop is never lawful when it can 
be effectuated only in that manner. It is not nice to have a gun pointed at 
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you by a policeman but it is worse to have a gun pointed at you by a 
criminal . . . . 
Serna-Barreto. 842 F.2d at 968. 
Finally, each of the cases defendant cites about police impermissibly using 
firearms in approaching suspects, (Def. Br. at 8-10), can be distinguished since none of 
the suspects involved made a sudden movement posing an immediate potential threat to 
the officers. In each case, police were acting affirmatively with weapons drawn. In 
defendant's case, Officer Turtle was reacting to defendant's suspicious action. 
Under the totality of circumstances, Officer Turtle's belief that defendant posed a 
potential threat to his and the other officer's safety was reasonable. 
B. The actions of Officers Turtle and Hoffman in freezing the situation and 
further investigating were reasonable. As discussed above, Officer Turtle's action was 
justified at its inception. The second part of the inquiry is whether further actions by 
the officers were "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place." Terry. 88 S.Ct. at 1879; McRae. 81 F.3d at 1533. 
The Terry standard is objective: "would the facts available to the officer at the 
moment of the seizure . . . 'warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that 
the action taken was appropriate?" 88 S.Ct. at 1881. In answering this question, the 
court must evaluate the officer's conduct in light of "common sense and ordinary 
human experience." United States v. Melendez-Garcia. 28 F.3d 1046, 1052 (10th Cir. 
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1994) (quoting United States v. King. 990 F.2d 1552, 1562 (10th Cir. 1993)). It must 
defer to "the ability of a trained law enforcement officer to distinguish between 
innocent and suspicious actions." United States v. Martinez-Cigarroa. 44 F.3d 908, 
912 (10th Cir.) (Baldock, J., concurring), cert.denied. 115 S.Ct. 1386 (1995) (citing 
United States v. Sokolow. 109 S.Ct. 1581 (1989)). And it must make the 
determination after evaluating he "totality of the circumstances." United States v. 
Fernandez. 18 F.3d 874, 878 (10th Cir. 1994). Whether the actions were reasonable 
"must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than 
with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Graham v. Connor. 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1872 (1989). 
"[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to 
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences reasonably 
warrant that intrusion." Terry. 88 S.Ct. at 1880. 
The officer's actions must also be examined in the context of the "balancing test" 
between "the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individuals' Fourth Amendment 
interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the 
intrusion." United States v. Place. 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2642 (1983). "When the nature 
and extent of the detention are minimally intrusive of the individual's Fourth 
Amendment interests, the opposing law enforcement interests can support a seizure 
based on less than probable cause." Id. 
Regarding the permissible scope of a Terry stop, the Supreme Court has written: 
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an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the investigative 
methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably 
available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of 
time. . . . It is the State's burden to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks 
to justify on the basis of reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in 
scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure. 
Florida v. Rover. 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325-26 (1993) (internal citations omitted). This 
does not mean that the court should indulge in abstract speculation in an effort to find 
potentially "less intrusive" investigative methods. See United States v. Sharpe. 105 
S.Ct. 1568, 1576 (1985). Instead, "the question is not simply whether some other 
alternative was available, but whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to 
recognize or to pursue it." Id. 
Defendant argues that the actions taken by the officers "were not minimally 
intrusive nor the least intrusive means available to confirm or deny that [defendant] was 
reaching for a weapon to use to assault the officers." (Def. Br. at 5). He focuses his 
concern on Officer Tuttle pointing his firearm at defendant (Def. Br. at 15-16). He 
also lists six factors from an 8th Circuit case in support of his argument (Def. Br. at 8, 
12-16).9 Opinions of the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals are controlling in this 
jurisdiction. The 10th Circuit recently noted: "There are no hard-and-fast rules 
9
 We have addressed factors (2) through (6), from United States v. Seelye. 815 
F.2d 48, 50 (8th Cir. 1987), in the body of the brief. Factor (1), the number of 
officers involved, helps focus on the central fact: defendant's sudden movement 
followed immediately his eye contact with Officer Tuttle, who then reacted to the 
perceived threat. 
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regarding the reasonableness of force used during investigatory stops, and prior cases 
have eschewed establishing any bright-line standards for permissible conduct. It is 
clear, however, that, because safety may require the police to freeze temporarily a 
potentially dangerous situation, both the display of firearms and the use of handcuffs 
may be part of a reasonable Terry stop." Merkley. 988 F.2d at 1064 (case cites 
omitted). 
In Merkley. the officers were informed that the defendant had threatened to kill 
someone and was acting violently. The officer who ultimately approached the defendant 
observed him pounding his fists on the steering wheel of the pickup truck. Given this 
information, the court ruled, the officers reasonably believed that Merkley was 
dangerous and were justified in displaying firearms and using handcuffs to freeze 
temporarily the situation in order to ensure their safety and that of the public. The court 
concluded that the scope of the stop was reasonably related in both time and manner to 
the suspicious circumstances on which it was initially based and upheld the district 
court's denial of Merkley fs motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of the stop. 
988 F.2d at 1064-65. 
In defendant's case, when he lunged forward causing Officer Tuttle to fear that 
he was reaching for a weapon, Officer Tuttle drew his firearm, pointed it at defendant, 
and ordered him to stop, to put his hands where he could see them, and then to put his 
hands on the steering wheel (R. 26-27, 36-38, 48, 59). Officer Tuttle and Officer 
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Hoffman walked closer to defendant's truck and looked through the windows to see if 
he was armed, or if there was a weapon within his reach (R. 27). 
While conceding that "officers need to act quickly on perceived safety threats", 
(Def. Br. at 14), defendant finds it "highly significant" that Officer Turtle "never 
asked" defendant "what he was reaching for, or whether he was reaching for a 
weapon." (Def. Br. at 15). Defendant also asserts that "[mjerely drawing his gun out 
of its holster, without aiming it directly at [defendant], would have been sufficient to 
protect the officers from any perceived danger." LL Defendant's suggestion that 
police be required under such circumstances to ask questions first and protect 
themselves later is contrary to "common sense and ordinary human experience," 
(Melendez-Garcia. 28 F.3d at 1052), and well-reasoned authority. 
"[Tjhe business of policemen . . . is to act, not to speculate or meditate . . . . 
People could well die in emergencies if police tried to act with the calm deliberation 
associated with the judicial process." Wavne v. United States. 318 F.2d 205, 212 
(D.C. Cir. 1963) (emphasis in original). "A police officer need not defer . . . 
protective measures to the point of peril." Young v. United States. 435 F.2d 405, 409 
(D.C. Cir. 1970). Officers not only have the right but the duty to respond to suspicious 
activity. State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103, 105 (Utah 1980). For this reason, "[t]he 
need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be 
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otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency." Mincey v. Arizona. 98 S.Ct. 
2408, 2413 (1978) (quoting Wayne. 318 F.2d at 212). 
In light of common sense and the foregoing authorities, Officer Turtle's actions 
were reasonable. An immediate threat, as perceived here, justifies action, not 
conversation. Further, briefly looking for weapons in the area immediately accessible 
to a suspect is far more reasonable than expecting a truthful answer from someone who 
appears to be preparing to shoot you. Finally, it was defendant's sudden movement 
upon making eye contact with Officer Turtle that prompted the officer's actions in the 
first place. Briefly restricting defendant's physical movement inside the truck and 
looking in the truck were the least intrusive means available to see what defendant was 
reaching for and to eliminate the possibility that he was armed. Since the entire 
incident lasted less than 30 seconds (R. 41), the intrusion on defendant was minimal 
when balanced against the officers' right to ensure their own safety. £££ Place. 103 
S.Ct. at 2642. The trial court's findings of fact, and its conclusion that the officers' 
actions were reasonable (R. 55-56), should not be disturbed. 
Point II 
EVIDENCE OBSERVED BY POLICE OFFICERS IN PLAIN VIEW 
IN DEFENDANT'S TRUCK WAS SUBJECT TO SEIZURE AND 
PROVIDED PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DEFENDANT'S ARREST 
Defendant claims that, because he was arrested without probable cause, his 
motion to suppress should have been granted (Def. Br. at 16). On the contrary, police 
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had probable cause to arrest defendant after they looked through the windows of his 
- truck during a valid protective seizure. 
Probable cause exists when from the facts known to the officer, and the 
inferences which fairly might be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in 
his position would be justified in believing that the suspect had committed the offense. 
State v. Anderson. 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996) (quoting State v. Cole. 674 P.2d 119, 
125 (Utah 1983) (quoting State v. Hatcher. 27 Utah 2d 318, 320, 495 P.2d 1259, 1260 
(1972) (footnote omitted)). The officer "need not have 'certain knowledge of the guilt 
of the suspect.'" State v. Ayala. 762 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah App. 1988) (citation 
omitted), cert.denied. 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). 
After approaching defendant's truck, Officer Hoffman saw several syringes 
through the open passenger side window (R. 27-28, 59). Officers Tuttle and Hoffman 
also saw blood on the inside crook of defendant's left elbow and concluded that 
defendant had recently injected drugs (R. 27, 29, 51, 59). Officer Tuttle asked 
defendant to get out of the truck (R. 28, 59). When defendant got out of the truck, 
both officers saw a can lid, an item commonly used to cook cocaine before injecting it, 
fall to the ground (R. 29, 59). Officer Hoffman also saw defendant toss a syringe with 
red fluid back in the truck (R. 42, 51, 59; cJL R. 29). 
The Supreme Court has applied the "plain view" doctrine in cases, such as this, 
where an officer inadvertently comes across an mcriminating object even though the 
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officer was not searching for it. See, e^., Harris v. United States. 88 S.Ct. 992 
(1968). Evidence may be seized by an officer without a warrant if: (1) the officer did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment "in arriving at the place from which the evidence 
could be plainly viewed"; (2) the officer had a lawful right of access to the seized 
object; and, (3) its mcriminating character is immediately apparent and the evidence is 
in plain view. United States v. Naugle. 997 F.2d 819, 822 (10th Cir.) (quoting Hoi&n 
v. California. 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990)), cert.denied. 114 S.Ct. 562 (1993); see also 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire. 91 S.Ct. 2022 (1991); Arizona v, Hicks, 107 S.Ct. 1149 
(1987); Texas v. Brown. 103 S.Ct. 1535 (1983). 
Officers Tuttle and Hoffman, patrolling a public street, had the right to walk by 
defendant's parked truck, and, based on his sudden movement, the right and the duty to 
see if he was armed by looking in the windows of the truck. Whittenback. 621 P.2d at 
105. The spot of blood on defendant's arm, the syringes in his possession, and the can 
lid for cooking cocaine were all in plain view and immediately mcriminating. 
Based on what they saw in plain view, the officers had probable cause to arrest 
defendant and the lawful right to seize the evidence. Se_e_ New York v. Belton. 101 
S.Ct. 2860 (1981); State v. Romero. 660 P.2d 715 (Utah 1983). 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
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MARK R . MOFFAT, ( 5 1 1 2 ) HAR 0 7 1995 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. *$* •' ~'*:Ut- •* 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 r • ttxl d.JltoAs 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 { "»"»<»* 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-v-
DAVID K. PETIT, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
QSMOOAbS 
Case No. 941017865FS 
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
DAVID K. PETIT, through his attorney of record, MARK R. 
MOFFAT, hereby moves this Court for an order suppressing all 
evidence obtained by law enforcement as a result of his illegal 
detention and arrest on October 13, 1994, at 258 South Rio Grande 
Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Petit asserts that his rights to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures, as guaranteed by Article I Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, were violated by officers Tuttle and Hoffman. 
Specifically, Officer Tuttle lacked a reasonable articulate 
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot when he drew his weapon 
on Petit and detained him SEE State v. Truiillo 739 p.2d 85 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987). 
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Additionally, the officer's actions in drawing his weapon on 
Mr. Petit and ordering hint to place his hands on top of the 
steering wheel amounted to a full-blown custodial arrest for which 
there was no probable cause. SEE Utah Code Ann. §§77-7-1, 77-7-2 
(1994). 
Petit asserts that all evidence seized following the violation 
of his constitutional rights was tainted by the officers illegal 
conduct and must be suppressed SEE Wong Sun v. United States 85 
S.Ct 407 (1963). 
DATED this v^ day of March, 1995. 
MARK R 
Attorney for 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the 
Salt Lake Deputy District Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, this 3 ^ day of March, 1995. 
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STATE OF UTAH 
V. 
DAVID K. PETIT 
CASE NO. 
CHARGE: 
941017865FS 
POCS 3° 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: 
COUNTY ATTORNEY: 
Mark R. Moffat 
Vincent Meister 
CIRCUIT COURT COMM.: 
DATE OF PH: 2/7/95 
TAPE NO. T-473-474 
Palacios 
COURTROOM CLOSED 
SWEARING OF WITNESS 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE INVOKED 
WAIVED FORMAL READING OF INFORMATION 
°6nom^ 
DIRECT EXAMINATION OF OFFICER MICHAEL TUTTLE 
1 Q. If you'd please state your name and spell your last name for 
2 the record. 
3 A. Michael Tuttle. T-U-T-T-L-E. 
4 Q. What's your occupation? 
5 A- I'm a police officer for Salt Lake City. 
€ Q. How long have you been with Salt Lake City. 
7 A. 3 1/2 years. 
8 Q. Are you a full certified police officer? 
9 A, Yes# sir. 
10 Q. What kind of experience and training have you had in the 
11 enforcement of controlled substance drugs? 
12 A. I've been through P.O.S.T. and I've also been through the 
13 Utah Drug Academy. 
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1 Q. Taking your attention back to October 13, 1994, at 19:55 
2 hours, 7:55 p.m., at 258 South Rio Grande, were you on duty at that 
3 time at that location? 
4 A. I was, sir. 
5 Q. Is that location in Salt Lake County? 
6 A. Yes, sir. 
7 Q. Did you observe anything at that time at that location? 
8 A. I did, sir. 
9 Q. And what was that? 
10 A. I noticed that Mr. Petit was inside of the truck that was 
11 facing south. As officers started walking across the street, Mr. 
12 Petit made eye contact with an officer then reached for something 
13 underneath or beyond our vision. 
14 Judge: Did that include you? 
15 A. Yes, ma'am. 
16 Moffat: I'm going to object to that, your honor, it calls for 
17 complete speculation as to what he was doing. 
18 Judge: All right. As to establish some foundation, he made eye 
19 contact with officers.... 
20 Meister: An officer. Would you say that it was a person that was 
21 in that vehicle, would you recognize that person if they were in 
22 court today? 
23 A. Yes, sir. 
24 Q. Is that person in court today? 
25 A. He is, sir. 
26 Q. Would you point out what he is wearing? 
2 
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1 A. The defendant in the pink and red checkered black shirt. 
2 Q. May the record reflect an identification of the defendant. 
3 Judge: Certainly. 
4 Q. And Officer Tuttle, how far away from that vehicle were you 
5 when you first saw the defendant? 
6 A. It was about 20 feet, sir. 
7 Q. And what was the lighting like at this location at this time? 
8 A. It was light—there was overhead light. 
9 Q. What was the visibility like? 
10 A. It was 30-40 feet, sir. 
11 Q. The lighting itself was it artificial lighting? 
12 A. Yes, sir. 
13 Q. Where was that located? 
14 A. In an overhead light, I wasn't exactly sure where it was in 
15 relation to the truck. 
16 Q. And when you initially saw this individual, did you make any 
17 eye contact with that individual? 
18 A. I did, sir. 
19 Q. That individual be the defendant? 
20 A. Yes, sir. 
21 Q. Who was with you at that time? 
22 A. Officer Hoffman and Officer Roland. 
23 Q. Were you officers in uniform? 
24 A. Yes, sir. 
25 Q. On foot or on in a vehicle? 
26 A. On f o o t , s i r . 
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1 Q. What did you do when you saw the defendant and made eye 
2 contact with him? 
3 A. I started to walk towards him, sir. 
4 Q. And how far were you from him at that time--the defendant's 
5 vehicle at that time? 
6 A. About 20 feet, sir. 
7 Q. And what then occurred? 
8 A. At that time, the person inside of the vehicle lunged forward 
9 in the front of the cab of the truck. 
10 Q. Where was that person seated in the front of the cab of the 
11 truck? 
12 A. In the driver's seat, sir. 
13 Q. Do you recall if the windows were up or down? 
14 A. I do not. 
15 Q. You do not recall? 
16 A. I do not recall. 
17 Q. When you said that they lunged forward, what occurred then? 
18 A. The driver of the truck reached down towards... the seat would 
19 be inside the truck on the left-hand side, the driver's left-hand 
20 side. 
21 Q. And what did you do at that time? 
22 A. I was concerned that the occupant was reaching for a weapon 
23 and I drew my pistol. 
24 Q. Did you say anything to the defendant? 
25 A. I told him to stop. 
26 Q. Did he stop? 
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He did. 
Did you give him any other orders? 
I told him to let me see his hands. 
Did he let you see his hands? 
He did. 
Did you tell him to do anything with his hands? 
I told him to put them on the steering wheel. 
Did he put them on the steering wheel? 
He did. 
Then what? 
I hollered and continued walking towards the truck. 
Did you get to the vehicle? 
•I did. 
Did you make any other observations? 
I noticed that there was blood on his left arm. 
Where on his left arm? 
Towards the elbow. 
Inside or outside the elbow. 
It was not in the elbow it was on the 
The crook of the elbow? 
Yes. 
Any other observations? 
I noticed that there was some. ...no, not at that time, no sir. 
Where was Officers Hoffman and Roland at this time? 
Officer Roland was behind me. Officer Hoffman was on the 
senger side of the truck. 
000027 
1 Q. Did you notice if Officer Hoffman made any observations? 
2 A. He did. 
3 Q. And what were those? 
4 A. He saw some paraphernalia, some syringes. 
5 Q. Do you know what happened at that time, when he saw those? 
6 A. He told me that he saw syringes. 
7 Q. What about the other syringes? 
8 Judge: Who told you that he saw syringes? 
9 Moffat: I object—it's hearsay. 
10 Judge: Sustained. Although, hearsay is allowable now at 
11 preliminary hearings, so I'll overrule. 
12 Moffat: It's what another officer saw, your honor, it's not 
13 reliable. 
14 Judge: Mr. Moffat, you...this... 
15 Moffat: Your honor, it's not reliable because it's statements 
16 made by a person preparing for court; in anticipation of 
17 prosecuting the defendant. Police reports don't come in... 
18 Judge: Wait, Wait....you're assuming that he's gathered this in 
19 a police report. I didn't get that. I guess that you were present 
20 when he said that, is that correct? 
21 A. Yes, ma'am. 
22 Judge: Overruled. You may proceed. 
23 Q. What did you do with that information? 
24 A. I then asked the driver to get out of the vehicle. 
25 Q. Did he get out of the vehicle? 
26 A. He did. 
6 
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1 Q. What other observations did you make at that time? 
2 A. I noticed the bottom of a pop can that had been cut off of a 
3 soda can, fell out of the vehicle as he exited the vehicle. 
4 Q. Did you know prior to that where that can was located? 
5 A. No, sir. 
6 Q. Did you have any conversation with the defendant as to what 
7 that can was? 
8 A. No, sir. 
9 Q. Any other observations that you made? 
10 A. I then asked him if he had any more syringes. 
11 Q. And his reply. 
12 A. He then said, "Just the one I was going to shoot up with". 
13 Q. And did you find that particular syringe that he made 
14 reference to? 
15 A. Yes, sir. 
16 Q. Can you describe that syringe? 
17 A. It was a typical insulin syringe. It had a red fluid inside 
18 of it. 
19 Q. How much red fluid inside of it? 
20 A. I cannot tell you exactly, sir. 
21 Q. How full was the syringe? 
22 A. About half full, sir. 
23 Q. And in your current experience, what did you believe that to 
24 be? 
25 A. I believe that to be blood that was intermixed with cocaine. 
26 Q. What did you do with that information? 
7 
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1 A. I then... 
2 Moffat: I object. 
3 Judge: I sustain that. I don't know...first of all, there is no 
4 basis for his opinion. Sustained. 
5 Judge: Officer, what did you believe it to be? More fluid that 
6 was cocaine? Where did that come from? Foundation, I suppose is.. 
7 Pros: Well, there was no objection when it came in.... 
8 Moffat: Well, (inaudible) 
9 Judge: And I'll grant that. I...quite frankly I watched Mr. 
10 Moffat when I heard the question and as I was listening to the 
11 answer he was formulating his objection. I could tell by the way 
12 he was looking at it. So, that's stricken. 
13 Q. What did you do with that syringe? 
14 A. The syringe was placed into evidence. 
15 Q. Do you know what happened with that syringe at that time after 
16 it was placed into evidence? 
17 A, It was then taken to the State Crime Lab for an analysis. 
18 Q. By whom? 
19 A. I don't know, sir. 
20 Q. No further questions. 
21 Judge: Thank you, cross examination. 
22 
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1 CROSS EXAMINATION 
2 
3 Q. Thank you. Mr. Tuttie, you've been a police officer for how 
4 many years? 
5 A. 3 1/2, sir. 
6 Q. And this drug academy, when did you attend it? 
7 A. Last year. 
8 Q. How many hours of training did you receive? 
9 A. 40 hours. 
10 Judge: Excuse me, this might be a good place to stop. Do you 
11 have some other officers that need to leave because we're not going 
12 to get through here. 
13 Pros:- I do, your honor 
14 Judge: O.K., why don't we finish cross on this officer and then 
15 if you have some things you have to take care of, go ahead and do 
16 it. This is probably all we'll do today. 
17 Pros: O.K. 
18 Judge: Go ahead. I'm sorry to interrupt you. 
19 Moffat: That's O.K. On October 13, 1994, you are on patrol, is 
20 that right? 
21 A. Yes, sir. 
22 Q. You're on foot patrol on the area of Rio Grande Street. 
23 A. Yes, sir. 
24 Q. That's down in the area of the shelter, am I right? 
25 A. Yes, sir. 
26 
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1 Q. And you're down there patrolling as part of a clean up or zero 
2 tolerance program that's taking place with the Salt Lake City 
3 Police Department in that area, isn't that correct? 
4 A. I've done that enforcing law, yes sir. 
5 Q. Enforcing laws is part of the program to clean that area up, 
6 isn't that right? 
7 A. No, sir. 
8 Q. No? 
9 A. No, sir. 
10 Q. You're on foot patrol with 3 other officers, isn't that 
11 correct? 
12 A. With 2 other officers, sir. 
13 Q. Were those officers Hoffman and Roland, isn't that correct? 
14 A. Yes, sir. 
15 Q. So, there is a total of 3 of you walking in tandem in that 
16 area, is that right? 
17 A. Yes, sir. 
18 Q. Now, you're down in that area and it's almost 8 o'clock at 
19 night, isn't that right? 
20 A. Yes, sir. 
21 Q. And in October at 8 o'clock at night it's dark, isn't that 
22 correct? 
23 A. It is true, yes sir. 
24 Q. The sun was not shining, was it? 
25 A. Not that I can recall, sir. 
26 
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1 Q. Now, you've been out in the area patrolling on foot. At that 
2 point in time there have been no calls of any reported crime, isn't 
3 that correct? 
4 A. That's correct, sir. 
5 Q. And just so that we have this clear, there have been no calls 
€ with anybody involving a weapon, isn't that'right? 
7 A. Correct, sir. 
8 Q. No crimes being phoned in about aggravated assault, or 
9 anything having to do with a weapon period, isn't that correct? 
10 A. Correct, sir. 
11 Q. And when you say that there are no crimes being called in, 
12 there has been absolutely nothing called in for you to investigate, 
13 isn't- that right? 
14 A. That's correct, sir. 
15 Q. Now, you said the area was lit. Which side of the road was 
16 this truck on that called your attention? 
17 A; On the west side, sir. 
18 Q. The west side. So, it's facing south? 
19 A. Yes, sir. 
20 Q. And you are on the east side walking north, is that correct? 
21 A. Yes, sir. 
22 Q. With your fellow officers? 
23 A. Yes, sir. 
24 Q. At approximately what south was the truck parked at? What 
25 south? 
26 A. The I have an exact address--258 South Rio Grande. 
11 
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1 Q. So, it's parked facing south in an area....you were heading 
2 south on Rio Grande just before you came to the restaurant on the 
3 right hand side, is that safe to say? 
4 A. Just before the parking lot, yes sir. 
5 Q. So, between the shelter and the restaurant... 
6 A. No, sir, by the entrance to the restaurant parking lot. 
7 Q. And you, when you first see the truck, where were you walking 
8 from, from what point. You come down 3rd South and take a right or 
9 are you coming up from an area further south of 3rd South? 
10 A. I can't recall what south I was coming up from. 
11 Q. You see the truck there, is that right? 
12 A. Yes, sir. 
13 Q. At this point in time that you see the vehicle, you're on the 
14 other side of the road, isn't that correct? 
15 A. That's correct, sir. 
16 Q. And at that point in time you see the person in the vehicle 
17 and that's Mr. Petit? 
18 A. Yes, sir. 
It Q. And as you look at Mr. Petit, you say or claim that he lunges 
20 forward, isn't that right? 
21 A. That's when we made eye contact, yes sir. 
22 Q. And you're still with your fellow officers on the other side 
23 of the road when you're seeing.... 
24 A. No, sir, we started walking towards the truck. 
25 
26 
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1 Q. O.K. and as you're walking towards the truck, prior to the 
2 time you're walking towards the truck, there is nothing unusual 
3 going on with that vehicle, isn't that correct? 
4 A. That's correct, sir. 
5 Q. Mr. Petit, the person in that vehicle, hasn't broken the law 
€ in any way. 
7 A. That's correct. 
8 Q. And when you indicate that you're about 20 feet away from the 
9 vehicle, you say that you see Mr. Petit lunge forward? 
10 A. Yes, sir. 
11 Q. You prepared the report in this case, didn't you officer? 
12 A. I did, sir. 
13 Q. And that report is a report that you endeavor to make as 
14 accurate as possible, isn't that correct? 
15 A. Correct, sir. 
16 Q. And that's what you're training tells you to do, isn't that 
17 correct? 
18 A. Yes, sir. 
19 Q. And any report prepared by you regarding this person it would 
20 have been in a report prepared very close in time to the events 
21 that are alleged to have taken place this particular evening, isn't 
22 that correct? 
23 A. It is. 
24 Q. So, anything stated in this report is probably the most 
25 accurate condition of facts as they occurred that evening, isn't 
26 that correct? 
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1 A. It is, sir, 
2 Q. In your report, you talk about the occupant and his 
3 activities, isn't that right? 
4 A. Yes, sir. 
5 Q. And in your report, you talk about the occupant reaching down 
€ to the side of his seat, isn't that correct? 
7 A. Yes, sir. 
8 Q. So, he didn't lunge forward. Those words never appear in your 
9 report, isn't that correct? 
10 A. Yes, that's correct, sir. 
11 Q. And you indicate that he instead that "he suddenly reached 
12 down inside the inside door", isn't that correct? 
13 A. Yes, sir. 
14 Q. And it's all you saw, isn't that right? 
15 A. Yes, sir. 
16 Q. You didn't see what was in the person's hands, isn't that 
17 right? 
18 A. That's right. 
19 Q. And, at that point in time even then the person has done 
20 nothing to violate the law, isn't that correct? 
21 A, Correct, sir. 
22 Q. You saw no violations of the law. 
23 A. No, sir. 
24 Q. And this activity that you described as "suddenly reaching 
25 down inside the inside door" prompts you to draw your weapon and 
26 draw down on this individual, isn't that correct? 
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1 A. It is, sir. 
2 Q. And the other officer draw down on this individual, isn't that 
3 correct? 
4 A. I don't know, sir. 
5 Q. It's possible, isn't it? 
6 A. It's possible, yes sir. 
7 Q. At this point in time, the occupant in that particular vehicle 
8 who hasn't done nothing against the law is now no longer free to 
9 leave, isn't that correct? 
10 A. That's correct, sir. 
11 Q. You had no idea what he was reaching for, did you? 
12 A. I had no idea, sir. 
13 Q. -You had no idea what he was reaching for down inside of the 
14 door. 
15 A. No, sir. 
16 Q. It could have been something as innocent as him dropping a cup 
17 of coffee or something along those lines and retrieving it, isn't 
18 that correct? 
19 A. I imagine sir, yes. 
20 Q. And yet, you see this activity, and this is the only activity 
21 you see prior to drawing down on him, isn't that correct? 
22 A. Yes, sir. 
23 Q. At that point in time, you start to order him to do things, 
24 isn't that right? 
25 A. Yes, sir. 
26 
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1 Q. And, at that point in time, one of the things you order him to 
2 do is to put his hands in plain view? 
3 A. Yes, sir. 
4 Q. At that time that you saw him, the driver of that vehicle, Mr. 
5 Petit, never made a threat to you, did he? 
6 A. No, sir. 
7 Q. Never behaved towards you in an aggressive manner at all, 
8 isn't that correct? 
9 A. Correct, sir. 
10 Q. And prior to the time that you drew your weapon, he never 
11 behaved in an aggressive manner towards you. All he did was reach 
12 down inside of his vehicle, isn't that correct? 
13 A. Sure. 
14 Q. That's a yes? 
15 A. Yes, sir. 
16 Q. And when you asked Mr. Petit to do the things that you were 
17 asking him to do, he complies with everything you ask him to do, 
18 isn't that right? 
19 A. Yes, sir. 
20 Q. Put his hands where they could be seen? 
21 A. Yes, sir. 
22 Q. And now there are 3 uniformed officers at the scene, isn't 
23 that correct? 
24 A. Yes, sir. 
25 Q. And as you're drawing down with your weapon, and I take it 
26 that it was loaded 
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1 A. Yes, sir. 
2 Q. You're pointing it directly at Mr. Petit, isn't that correct? 
3 A. Yes, sir. 
4 Q. And the other officers are to your side or behind you, where 
5 are they? 
6 A. I can't tell you, sir. 
7 Q. Do you have any idea. Can you make an educated guess? 
8 A. I don't know where they were at. 
9 Q. Well, let's talk about this. Here you are walking down the 
10 sidewalk, all 3 of you together, prior to the time you see the 
11 truck. Where are the officers at that point in time? 
12 A. At the side of me. 
13 Q. Did you cross the street, or did you step into the street at 
14 that point? 
15 A. Yes, sir. 
16 Q. And as you step into the street the officers are on either 
17 side of you? 
18 A. Yes, sir. 
19 Q. You see the truck, you see the activity in the truck, it's 
20 safe to assume that the officers are again on either side, isn't 
21 that correct? 
22 A. Yes, sir. 
23 Q. Clearly, anybody seated in the vehicle is going to see you and 
24 the other officers without question, isn't that right? 
25 A. Yes, sir. 
26 Q. All of you are in uniform? 
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1 A. Yes, sir. 
2 Q. You walked over and address Mr. Petit, isn't that correct? 
3 A. Yes, sir. 
4 Q. At the time that you address him, he's certainly not free to 
5 leave, isn't that correct? 
6 A. That's correct, sir. 
7 Q. And you're clearly there to investigate something, isn't that 
8 right? 
9 A. Yes, sir. 
10 Q. You ask him questions. 
11 A. Yes, sir. 
12 Q. What was the first question you asked Mr. Petit? 
13 A. -I can't recall, sir. It's in my report there. 
14 Q. Is it in there? 
15 A. I don't know sir. 
16 Judge: Why don't you take a look at it to see if it refreshes 
17 your recollection. Just read it to yourself and then he'll ask you 
18 the question. In fact, while he's doing that, why don't we take 
19 the recess, all right. (Recess observed) 
20 Judge: All right, we're back on the record now. The State of 
21 Utah versus David K. Petit. Mr. Moffat, you'd asked the officer in 
22 question if he was given an opportunity to refresh his 
23 recollection, did he have an opportunity to do that? 
24 Officer: Yes, ma'am. 
25 Judge: All right, you may proceed, Mr. Moffat. 
26 Moffat: Is it in your report? 
18 
0 0 0 0 4 0 
1 A. The conversation is, it was brief, sir. After I told him to 
2 put his hands in plain view, there was no more conversation until 
3 I told him to get out of the car. 
4 Q. Prior to the time that you asked him to exit the vehicle, did 
5 any of the other officers have conversation with Mr. Petit to your. 
6 knowledge? 
7 A. No, sir, 
8 Q. How much time elapsed would you say from the time you 
9 initially asked him to put his hands on the wheel until the time 
10 you asked him to exit the vehicle? 
11 A. 10 or 15 seconds. 
12 Q. So, a very short period. 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. I want to go back and talk about something that occurred prior 
15 to the time that you come down on Mr. Petit. At the time that you 
16 noticed that the vehicle was (inaudible) and made eye contact with 
17 you. 
18 A. Yes, sir. 
19 Q. At that point in time, Mr. Petit was not a person that you 
20 recognized as any type of dangerous person or dangerous felon that 
21 you were to be looking out for, isn't that correct? 
22 A. That's correct, sir. 
23 Q. There was nothing about the truck; in other words, the truck 
24 wasn't a truck that you would remember popping up on any type of 
25 NCIC warrant sheet or anything like that or being associated with 
26 any type of crime or violent crime, isn't that correct? 
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1 A. That is correct. 
2 Q. Now, in reading from what I believe is your report, it is 
3 something that you and I discussed while we were off the record, 
4 you speak of yourself in the third person, isn't that correct? 
5 A. Yes, sir. 
6 Q. At the time that you, you're asking the person driving the 
7 vehicle, Mr. Petit, questions isn't that correct? 
8 A. I asked him 3 questions. 
9 Q. • All right. And, at the time that you asked him these 3 
10 questions, it was a time after you had noticed some things occur, 
11 isn't that correct? 
12 A. During that time, sir, yes. 
13 Q. Prior to the time that you asked him these questions, if I 
14 read your report correctly, you indicated that he was handcuffed 
15 and that Officer Hoffman watched him throw a syringe full of liquid 
16 from his hand, isn't that correct? 
17 A. He threw it before he was handcuffed, yes sir. 
18 Q. Before he was handcuffed? 
19 A. Yes, sir. 
20 Q. If I had to sequence down then, you'd ask him questions, is 
21 that correct? 
22 A. Correct, sir. 
23 Q. And just to be clear, Officer, prior to the time that you 
24 asked Mr. Petit questions he's clearly cuffed, isn't that correct? 
25 A. Yes, sir. 
26 
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1 Q. And at that point in time, prior to questioning, did you ever 
2 advise him of his rights? 
3 A. No, sir. 
4 Q. There was never Miranda read to him, isn't that correct? 
5 A. No, sir. 
6 Q. And it's following those questions 'where he makes the 
7 statements about the syringe, isn't that correct? 
8 A. It is, sir. 
9 Q. That's all I have, your honor. 
10 Judge: Any redirect? 
11 
12 RE-DIRECT 
13 
14 Q. Officer Tuttle, why did you draw your weapon? 
15 A. I was concerned he was going for a weapon, sir. 
16 Q. And what made you believe that? 
17 A. Because of the sight and reaction upon seeing the officer. 
18 Q. And what was that reaction, specifically? . 
19 A. That he was reaching down into an area that I couldn't see. 
20 Q. To your knowledge, was anything else found inside of that 
21 vehicle? 
22 A. No, sir, other than the syringes. 
23 Q. If you would read the report, would that refresh your memory 
24 as to whether or not anything else was found? 
25 A. I could read it again.... 
26 Moffat: He has already read the report. 
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1 Judge: In reading the report, does that refresh your 
2 recollection? 
3 A. Yes, ma'am. 
4 Judge: All right, was there anything else beside the syringes? 
5 A. Not inside the truck, no ma'am. 
€ Q. Have you had an opportunity to read Officer Hoffman's report? 
7 A. I have not, sir. 
8 Q. Do you have a copy of that? 
9 A. I do, sir. 
10 Q. Would you please read that for us quickly? 
11 Moffat: Your honor, I think I know where Mr. Meister may be 
12 going. Before I ask the question, I think the officer can testify 
13 to anything that he found and saw. I don't know that he can 
14 testify to the other officer's statement. 
15 Q. And that was going to be my question, does that refresh your 
16 memory as to whether or not anything else was found? 
17 A. Officer Hoffman found these, yes sir. 
18 Q. Did you observe what was found? 
19 A. Not at the time, sir. Not while Officer Hoffman did it. 
20 Later I did, yes, he showed me. 
21 Judge: Where ? 
22 A. At the scene, ma'am. 
23 Judge: How much later? 
24 A. A couple of minutes. •. .within a couple of minutes' span. 
25 Q. And what was that? 
26 
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1 A. A wrapper containing a white substance and then the various 
2 syringes. 
3 Q. What did that white substance field test, do you know? 
4 A. No sir. 
5 Q. No further questions. 
6 
7 RE-CROSS 
S 
9 Q. When you saw the individual in the truck, at that point in 
10 time you weren't making any quick motions towards the vehicle, 
11 isn't that correct? 
12 A. That's correct, sir. 
13 Q. And there was nothing you were doing that would cause really 
14 anybody concern that you were going to go over and have contact 
15 with the truck, isn't that correct? 
16 A. That's correct. 
17 Q. And this notion that you had when you saw the person in the 
18 truck move, it's speculation on your part, isn't that correct? 
19 A. Yes, sir. 
20 Q. It's sort of a hunch that you had, isn't that correct? 
21 A. It was a concern I had, yes sir. 
22 Q. A concern that's based only on the motion that you witnessed, 
23 isn't that correct? 
24 A. Yes, sir. 
25 Q. That's all I have, Judge. 
26 
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1 DIRECT EXAMINATION OF OFFICER HOFFMAN 
2 
3 Moffat: For the record, would you please state your full name? 
4 A. David P. Hoffman. 
5 Q. You are employed with the Salt Lake City Police, is that 
6 correct? 
7 A. Yes, sir. 
8 Q. How long have you been so employed? 
9 A. Just about 3 1/2 years. 
10 Q. Did you happen to go through post training? 
11 A. Yes, sir. 
12 Q. Did you go through with Officer Tuttle? 
13 A. -I did. 
14 Q. So, you've been on the force as long as Officer Tuttle, isn't 
15 that correct? 
16 A. Yes, sir, that's correct. 
17 Q. The two of you are friends, isn't that right? 
18 A. Yes, sir. 
19 Q. Do you always patrol together with Officer Tuttle? 
20 A. Just about all of the time, yes sir. 
21 Q. So you guys are partners as well. 
22 A. Yes, sir. 
23 Q. Pretty tight. 
24 A. Yes, sir. 
25 Q. On the evening of October 13, 1994, you were on patrol, is 
26 that correct? 
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1 A. Yes, sir. 
2 Q. You were on patrol in the area of the shelter? 
3 A. Yes, sir. 
4 Q. You're on foot patrol with Officer Hoffman and another 
5 officer, isn't that correct? 
6 A. With Officer Tuttle (inaudible), yes sir. 
7 Q. So, there's a total of 3. 
8 A. Yes, sir. 
9 Q. How long had the 3 of you been on patrol that particular 
10 evening, prior to say...8:00? 
11 A. My guess would be approximately 4 hours. 
12 Q. Now, it's clearly dark outside, isn't that correct? 
13 A. Yes, sir. 
14 Q. While you're patrolling, there had been no reports of any 
15 crime in the area that you were called to investigate, isn't that 
16 correct? 
17 A. That's true. 
18 Q. And certainly no reports of any violent crime involving 
19 weapons in the area, is that correct? 
20 A. That's correct. 
21 Q. Now, as the three of you are patrolling, you notice a vehicle, 
22 isn't that correct? 
23 A. Yes, sir. 
24 Q. And you're patrolling walking north on the east side of Rio 
25 Grande, isn't that correct? 
26 A. That's correct. 
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1 Q. And the vehicle is parked on the west side of Rio Grande 
2 facing south, isn't that correct? 
3 A. That's correct. 
4 Q. And as you are patrolling, you see the vehicle, isn't that 
5 correct? 
6 A. Yes, sir. 
7 Q. And you see the vehicle while you are still on the other side 
8 of the street, isn't that correct? 
9 A. Yes, sir. 
10 Q. As you look at the vehicle, you notice the occupant in the 
11 vehicle, isn't that correct? Did you notice the occupant? 
12 A. Not until after the other officer's had. 
13 Q. -Is that after the other officers had drawn their weapons? 
14 A. No, that was just before as we're walking toward the vehicle. 
15 Q. All right. How far way were you from the vehicle when officer 
16 Tuttle drew his weapon? 
17 A. Urn, maybe 10-15 feet. 
18 Q. Could it have been as many as 20? 
19 A. Possibly so. 
20 Q. And when Officer Tuttle drew his weapon, did you draw your 
21 weapon? 
22 A. No, sir. 
23 Q. Did the other officer draw his weapon? 
24 A. I don't recall if he did or not. 
25 Q. You never saw the individual in the vehicle break any law, did 
26 you? 
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1 A. No, sir. 
2 Q. Prior to the time that the two of you started walking towards 
3 the vehicle, there was nothing about the vehicle that indicated to 
4 you that it was a dangerous vehicle, isn't that correct? 
5 A. Nothing that I observed, 
6 Q. And there's nothing about the driver that you observed and 
7 indicated that he was a dangerous individual, isn't that correct? 
8 A. Nothing I observed. 
9 Q. There's only what Officer Tuttle observed that caused a 
10 concern, isn't that correct? 
11 A. Yes, sir. 
12 Q. You didn't see the things that Officer Tuttle saw, isn't that 
13 correct? 
14 A. No, sir, I didn't. 
15 Q. You didn't see the individual in the vehicle reaching or 
16 lunging suddenly at all, did you? 
17 A; No, sir. 
18 Q. And you were watching the individual in the vehicle, isn't 
19 that correct? 
20 A. I was watching toward the rear of the vehicle. 
21 Q. But you were watching the person in the vehicle, isn't that 
22 correct? 
23 A. I was walking around behind the vehicle and the person was out 
24 of sight because I was doing something. 
25 Q. The person in the vehicle wasn't behaving aggressively? 
26 A. No, sir. 
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1 Q. For all intents and purposes, the person in the vehicle was 
2 being compliant with whatever you officers were asking him to do, 
3 isn't that correct? 
4 A. Not compliant to Officer Tuttle or his weapon wouldn't have 
5 been drawn. 
6 Q. You don't know why Officer Tuttle drew his weapon do you? 
7 A. No sir, I don't. 
8 Q. Officer Tuttle did not call out any type of request to the 
9 individual prior to drawing his weapon, did he? 
10 A. I don't recall. 
11 Q. There's nothing in your report to indicate that anything like 
12 that happened, did it? 
13 A. No sir. 
14 Q. Your report is an accurate report, isn't it? 
15 A. I would assume so, yes sir. 
16 Q. You strive to make them accurate, don't you? 
17 A. Yes,sir. 
18 Q. That's what your training tells you to do? 
19 A. Yes, sir. 
20 Q. Again, the fact that there would be nothing in the report to 
21 indicate that the individual was "non compliant" would be 
22 significant in your mind, wouldn't that be correct? 
23 A. Yes, sir, it would. 
24 Q. That's all I have, your honor. 
25 
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1 CROSS EXAMINATION OF OFFICER HOFFMAN 
2 
3 Meister: Officer Hoffman, you saw the defendant seated next to 
4 defense counsel table, in that vehicle on that night? 
5 A. Yes, sir. 
6 Q. Nobody else was in that vehicle? 
7 A. No one else. 
8 Q. Prior to his being removed from the vehicle, you saw him throw 
9 a syringe? 
10 A. Yes, sir. 
11 Q. You saw that syringe in his possession? 
12 A. Yes, sir. 
13 Q. You saw a bloody arm? 
14 A. Yes, sir. 
15 Q. With the fresh needle prick? 
16 A. Yes, sir. 
17 Q; Fresh blood? 
18 A. Yes, sir. 
19 Q. No further questions. 
20 Moffat: You had no idea how long the vehicle was there prior to 
21 the time that you arrived. 
22 A. I don't. 
23 Judge: Anything more? 
24 Pros: Nothing. 
25 
26 Judge: You may step down. Mr. Moffat, do you want to advise 
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1 your client? 
2 Moffat: O.K. Mr. Petit, you have a right to testify, but if you 
3 do so today, your testimony will be under oath and subject to 
4 cross-examination by the State's attorney, Mr. Meister. My advice 
5 to you is that you not testify today, will you follow my advice? 
6 Defendant: Yes. 
7 Moffat: Your honor, we rest. 
8 Judge: All right. 
9 
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Appendix D 
1
 THE COURT: Good morning, Gentlemen. Let's go 
2
 ahead in t h i s matter of State versus David Pe t i t . Thm is' 
3
 the time s e t for a hearing on the Defendant's Motion t o 
4
 Suppress mvidence. Counsel, would you s ta te your names for 
5 the record? 
6 I MR. MEISTER: Vincent Meister for the State, Your 
7
 Eonor. 
8 MR. MOFFAT: Mark moffat on behalf of Mr. Petit. 
9 THE COURT* Arm you ready to proceed. Gentlemen? 
1
° MR. MEISTER» State is ready to proceed. 
11
 I MR. MOFFAT: We are. Your Honor. In the interest 
12
 of conserving judicial resources, Mr. Meister and I have 
13
 struck an agreement regarding what the court should consider 
14
 for the purposes of this hearing. We submitted to the court] 
15
 I a copy of the preliminary hearing transcript. 
16
 THE COURT: Z have it. 
17
 MR. MOFFAT: Zn addition to that. Your Honor, we 
18
 would submit to the court and mam to admit Defendant's Exhib] 
19
 I it one, which is the no-warrant arrest fact sheet prepared 
20 by Officer Tuttle, the arresting officer in this case. We 
21
 would likewise at this time. Your Honor, just for purposes 
22
 of the record, to make it clearjwe would move to admit the 
23
 COpy 0f the preliminary hearing transcript. Z haven't done 
24
 | this before and haven't made that particular motion and sort] 
of running into trouble with the Court of Appeals. Zf we 25 
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don't, we'll be relying on it for purposes o f — w e would mov4 
to admit it and ask it be the official, stipulated version 
of the facts that we'll be relying on in addition to what is 
contained in the arrest fact eheet. 
THE COURTt Mr. Meister? 
MR. MEISTER: That is correct, Your Honor. Z 
believe there are a couple of other facts the State would 
proffer, being stipulated that being that this particular 
scene is down on Bio Grande Street, the address being 258 
South Rio Grande and is an area known to these particular 
officers as an area of heavy trafficking and heavy area of 
considerable crime. And that in the officer's training and 
experience in that particular area, that they have taken num-f-
erous weapons off individuals in tie course of their duties 
down in that particular area. 
THE COURTs Accept that stipulation, counsel? 
MR. MOFFAT: W e believe that's what the officers 
would testify to, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Now, with that then, Z take it that 
you're not intending to introduce any evidence today? 
MR. MOFFAT: That's correct. Your Honor. Be rely-
ing on the stipulated facts as presented by Mr. Meister's 
proffer as well as the documents that we've provided to the 
court and move to admit. 
THE COURT: Very well then, the court will receive 
ft ft ft 0 C c 3 
10 
1
 as evidence. Exhibit one, which la the mo-warrant arrest 
2
 fact sheet. We'll receive and mark aa Exhibit 2, the trans 
3
 cript of the preliminary hearing and consider the Matters 
4
 you just indicated that the officers would testify to as 
5
 I well and aake it's decision. You wish to sake some oral 
argument? 
7
 I MR. MOFFATt We do. Your Honor. 
8
 MR. MEXSTERt Z would enquire of the court as to 
9
 I whether or not the court has had an opportunity to read the 
revised preliminary hearing transcript? 
11
 I THE COURT: I have not. 
12
 | MR. MEXSTER: So it might be best and counsel can 
interrupt if he doesn't agree with my summation of what the 
preliminary hearing transcript says. It's the State's und-
erstanding of the law, that because this is a warrantless 
16
 I search, the State has the burden of proving that this parti 
17
 | cular search or this particular subject was valid. 
The State's understanding of the facts. Your Honor 
19
 | that on October 13th, 1994 at 258 South Rio Grande, at appr 
20
 I omixately eight o'clock p.m. in Salt Lake County, Officers 
21
 ' Hoffman, Tuttle and Roland, were walking in that particular 
area. It's a known area of high drug trafficking. And as 
they were walking down the street. Officer Tuttle saw the 
defendant, parked in a pick-up truck, approximately 15 to 
twenty feet away. Officer Tuttle made eye-contact with the 
13 
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Appendix E 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
State of Utah, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : 
: CASE NO: 951900265 FS 
VS. • 
: JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
David K. Petit, 
Defendant. : 
This matter of the defendant's Motion to Suppress was submitted to the court on the 
record, by stipulation, the court heard oral argument and having taken the matter under 
advisement now finds and rules as follows: 
The court finds that at the time of this incident in question the defendant was parked in 
his vehicle, after dark, in a high crime area of Salt Lake City, Utah, a location known to the 
officers as a high drug crime area and an area in which the officers had previously taken 
numerous weapons from individuals. 
The officers were walking and not in vehicles at the time eye contact was first made with 
the defendant. The officers at all times were on a public street in a location they were entitled 
by law and required by duty to be. The officers were walking toward the defendant's vehicle 
which was on the opposite side of the street from the officers. There is nothing unreasonable 
about the officers conduct so fan An officer is entitled to ask questions of anyone at anytime 
so long as there is no detention. 
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When Officer Tuttle was within fifteen to twenty feet from the defendant's vehicle the 
defendant made a lunging motion downward into an area that could not been seen by Officer 
Tuttle. While this movement by the defendant is as consistent with defendant lunging for a 
spilled cup of coffee (as argued by defense Counsel) it is also just as consistent given the time 
and location, etc., with the defendant going for a weapon. Officer Tuttle, cm foot, and 
completely vulnerable, was not obligated to wait and see what the defendant had in his hands 
before action was taken for self protection. At about this time Officer Hoffman on the other side 
of the vehicle was also standing on a public roadway and where he was entitled to be, observed 
in plain site the defendant throw a syringe and observed a needle mark with fresh blood on the 
defendant's arm. 
It was reasonable under the circumstances for Officer Tuttle to ask the defendant to exit 
his vehicle, at which time additional contraband was observed and the defendant made comments 
admitting that he was in possession of a syringe. 
The circumstances of this case, in the opinion of the court, are different from those cases 
where officers detain suspects and conduct searches simply on the strength of fidgety, nervous 
movement by those suspects. In this case the court is of the opinion that the officer, under all 
of the circumstances, was reasonably justified in acting as he did for self protection. 
The officer's actions were not unreasonable nor in violation of the defendant's 
constitutional rights and accordingly the Motion to Suppress is denied. 
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Counsel for the State is to prepare a more detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
and an order, submit the same to opposing Counsel for approval as to form and then to this 
court for signature. 
Dated this / ^ d a v of April, 1995. 
Frank G. Noel 
District Court Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
Decision, postage prepaid, to the following this / J X day of April, 1995. 
Ruth McCloskey 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Mark R. Moffat 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDERS 
Attorney for Defendant 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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